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1. Introductory remarks: brief  evolution of  social rights at an 
EU normative level and progressive reference to the Council of  
Europe social rights instruments
The current challenges in the field of  social rights, both at normative and 
jurisprudential levels within the EU, must be faced in the context of  the “European Pillar 
of  Social Rights”, which was announced by the President of  the European Commission, 
Jean-Claude Juncker, in his State of  the Union address in September 2015 and was 
formally adopted in April 2017.2 In addition, this Pillar must be conceived as part of  
the most recent social rights developments having emerged in the so-called “Turin 
process for the European Social Charter”, which harmoniously focuses joint efforts of  
the Council of  Europe and the EU to consolidate the European Social Charter as a 
veritable European pact for the social stability of  the Council of  Europe’s three pillars: 
social democracy, the welfare state and social rights.3 Such harmony should lead to 
synergies aimed at reaching the best attainable standard for social rights in the EU.4
With this in mind, the evolution of  social rights at EU normative level has been 
linked to the realisation of  the social policy, whose objectives are currently established in 
Article 151 TFEU.5 This provision, and, in particular, its last paragraph (harmonisation 
2 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of  Regions establishing a European Pillar of  Social Rights, Brussels, 
26 April 2017, COM(2007) 250 final. This pillar sets out 20 principles and rights to support fair 
and well-functioning labour markets and welfare systems. It is designed as a compass for a renewed 
process of  upward convergence towards better working and living conditions within the Union. The 
pillar is primarily conceived for the euro area but applicable to all EU Member States wishing to 
be part of  it. It was prepared by the Commission, in consultation with stakeholders at all levels, 
including the Secretary General of  the Council of  Europe, who recently made public his opinion 
on the initiative (Strasbourg, 2 December 2016), where he states reminds that “the European Social 
Charter of  the Council of  Europe represents an essential component of  the continent’s architecture of  fundamental 
rights and is therefore seen as the Social Constitution of  Europe”. The Pillar reaffirms rights that are 
already present in the EU and international legal acquis, including the European Social Charter 
The principles and rights enshrined in the Pillar are structured around three categories: equal 
opportunities and access to the labour market, fair working conditions and social protection and 
inclusion. The Pillar is presented under two legal forms with identical content: as a Commission 
Recommendation, and as proposal for a joint proclamation by the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission. On this basis, the Commission will now enter into discussions with 
the European Parliament and the Council to work towards broad political support and high-level 
endorsement of  the Pillar. 
3 The “Turin process” was launched by the Secretary General of  the Council of  Europe at the High-
Level Conference on the ESC organised in Turin on 17-18 October 2014 by the Council of  Europe 
in co-operation with the Italian Presidency of  the Council of  the EU and the Turin municipality. 
Such process aims at reinforcing the normative system of  the ESC within the Council of  Europe 
and in its relationship with the law of  the EU. Its key objective is to improve the implementation 
of  social and economic rights at the continental level, in parallel to the civil and political rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR. See all relevant documents in: http://www.coe.int/en/web/turin-process. 
4 Social rights are also a EU priority for cooperation with the Council of  Europe in 2016-2017 
by “reinforcing regular dialogue and cooperation with the Council of  Europe on the interaction 
between the European Social Charter and the laws and policies of  the EU” (priorities adopted by 
the Council of  the EU on 18 January 2016). 
5 Article 151 TFEU: “The Union and the Member States, having in mind fundamental social rights such as those 
set out in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in the 1989 Community Charter 
of  the Fundamental Social Rights of  Workers, shall have as their objectives the promotion of  employment, improved 
living and working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, 
proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of  human resources with a 
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of  social systems), has its precedent in the opening provision of  Chapter 1 (“Social 
Provisions”) of  Title III (“Social Policy”) of  the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (TEEC), i.e. Article 117.6
In truth, the 1957 TEEC contained few provisions on social policy, which were 
conceived closely related to two important goals: free competition and worker mobility. 
In this regard, it has been noted that economic integration was the primary objective 
of  the EEC and its predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
and the founding Treaties reflected this.7 In this sense, even the Treaties establishing 
the ECSC in 1951 and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) in 1957, 
emphasized social policy more than the Treaty of  Rome did. This is by virtue of  
the fact that they referred to specific industries (coal, steel, nuclear energy) and the 
ECSC and EAEC had strong social policy mandates to deal with the employment and 
health effects of  these rapidly changing industries. The ECSC had funds to deal with 
redundant workers, and the EAEC was empowered to set health and safety standards.
Then, the adoption of  the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 gave a new 
impetus to several areas of  social policy, especially in the working environment (as 
regards the health and safety of  workers) and in the social dialogue (new Articles 
118a and 118b TEEC). The SEA also introduced in its Preamble, the first reference 
to the 1961 European Social Charter in the founding Treaties.8 This reference to the 
main Social Rights Treaty of  the Council of  Europe acquired binding value with the 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty, through its inclusion in the former Article 117 TEEC, which 
became Article 136 TEC. The content of  the latter, through the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, 
has remained identical in Article 151 TFEU (with the exception of  the updated notions 
of  “Union” – instead of  “Community” – and “internal market” – instead of  “common 
market”).9 
Indeed, social progress has been introduced asymmetrically (according to the 
view to lasting high employment and the combating of  exclusion. To this end the Union and the Member States 
shall implement measures which take account of  the diverse forms of  national practices, in particular in the field of  
contractual relations, and the need to maintain the competitiveness of  the Union economy”. They believe that such 
a development will ensue not only from the functioning of  the internal market, which will favour 
the harmonisation of  social systems, but also from the procedures provided for in the Treaties and 
from the approximation of  provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action”. 
6 Article 117 TEEC: “Member States hereby agree upon the necessity to promote improvement of  the living 
and working conditions of  labour so as to permit the equalisation of  such conditions in an upward direction. They 
consider that such a development will result not only from the functioning of  the Common Market which will favour 
the harmonisation of  social systems, but also from the procedures provided for under this Treaty and from the 
approximation of  legislative and administrative provisions”. 
7 K.M. Anderson, Social Policy in the European Union, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 52-54. 
8 According to the Preamble of  the SEA, Member States were “determined to promote democracy on the 
basis of  the fundamental rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of  the Member States, in the Convention for 
the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter, notably freedom, 
equality and social justice”.  
9 In particular, Article 151 TFEU explicitly mentions “the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 
18 October 1961” (together with the 1989 Community Charter of  the Fundamental Social Rights 
of  Workers). In parallel, in the Preamble of  TEU Member States confirm “their attachment to 
fundamental social rights as defined in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in 
the 1989 Community Charter of  the Fundamental Social Rights of  Workers”. From a formal point of  view, 
the contribution of  the Lisbon Treaty to the social policy seems merely terminological. Indeed, 
apart from including the area of  “social policy” in the scope of  “shared competence between the Union and 
the Member States”, the Lisbon Treaty states that the heading of  Title XI of  “social policy, education, 
vocational training and youth” (old numbering of  the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
TEC) shall be replaced by the heading “social policy” with new renumbering (Title X) in TFEU. 
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dynamic of  the Europe of  different speeds) in EU Primary Law. Thus, in 1989, the 
United Kingdom was the only one of  the then twelve Member Countries of  the Union 
that did not sign the Community Charter of  the Fundamental Social Rights of  Workers, 
even though this was conceived as a mere policy document with no compulsory value. 
In 1992, it was also necessary to include the nucleus of  social policy as a Protocol 
attached to the Maastricht Treaty to make an opting out clause possible, once again 
for the United Kingdom. For their part, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty improved the 
extent of  the anti-discriminatory clause (new Article 13 TEC), while the 2001 Nice 
Treaty created the new Social Protection Committee and tried to better implement 
the “open method of  co-ordination”, compensating the achievement of  the market with 
the protection of  social rights. Finally, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty gave binding effect to 
the Charter of  Fundamental Rights (CFREU) [new Article 6(1) TEU] by allowing 
initial confusing opt-out clauses by Poland and the United Kingdom and later on, by 
the Czech Republic.10 Unfortunately, the European social model has, once again, been 
challenged by the United Kingdom as a part of  the “Brexit” vote.11
2. Social rights protection through the CJEU’s praetorian case-
law
In theory, it might be argued that social rights were capable of  benefiting from 
the initial CJEU’s praetorian case-law according to which, without a written legal basis, 
individual rights “arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty” and “independently 
of  the legislation of  Member States”, since these rights “become part of  their legal heritage” 
(Judgment of  5 February 1963, Van Gend & Loos, case 26/62). Otherwise said, social 
rights should be included among the “fundamental rights enshrined in the general principles of  
Community law and protected by the Court” (Judgment of  12 November 1969, Stauder, Case 
29/69), as well as in the; “fundamental rights recognized and protected by the Constitutions” of  
Member States and; “similarly, international treaties for the protection of  human rights on which 
the Member States have collaborated or of  which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which 
should be followed within the framework of  Community law” (Judgment of  14 May 1974, Nold, 
Case 4/73).
This theoretical approach seemed to be confirmed in Defrenne III (Judgment of  15 
June 1978, Case 149/77) when the Court held that it “has repeatedly stated that respect for 
10 See Protocol No. 30 appended to the treaties and concerning the application of  the EU Charter 
to Poland and the United Kingdom (which restricts its interpretation by the Court of  Justice and 
the domestic courts of  these two countries, in particular concerning the rights on “Solidarity”) as 
well as Protocol attached to the Presidency Conclusions of  the European Council of  29-30 October 
2009 (Protocol on the application of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union to the Czech 
Republic implying the amendment of  Protocol No. 30). 
11 See the British Government’s official “Brexit White Paper” (under the title The United Kingdom’s 
exit from and new partnership with the European Union, presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister 
Theresa May, February 2017), in particular chapter 2 (“Taking control of  our own laws”: “We will take 
control of  our own affairs, as those who voted in their millions to leave the EU demanded we must, and bring 
an end to the jurisdiction in the UK of  the Court of  Justice of  the European Union”, p. 13) and chapter 7 
(“Protecting workers’ rights”: “UK employment law already goes further than many of  the standards set out in 
EU legislation and this Government will protect and enhance the rights people have at work”, p. 31). On the 
other hand, paragraph 2 of  the Judgement given on 24 January 2017 by the Supreme Court of  
the UK summarizes the domestic procedure leading to the Brexit vote and the complex procedure 
of  withdrawal under Article 50 TFEU (see https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/article-50-brexit-
appeal.html, visited on 8 February 2017). 
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fundamental personal human rights is one of  the general principles of  Community law, the observance 
of  which it has a duty to ensure” and added in relation to Article 119 TEEC that “there can 
be no doubt that the elimination of  discrimination based on sex forms part of  those fundamental rights. 
Moreover, the same concepts are recognized by the European Social Charter of  18 October 1961 and 
by Convention No. 111 of  the International Labour Organization of  25 June 1958 concerning 
discrimination in respect of  employment and occupation”. However, the CJEU refused to 
consider that, in light of  Article 119 “Community law contains any general principle prohibiting 
discrimination based on sex as regards the conditions of  employment and working conditions of  men 
and women” and, therefore, there was “no rule of  the Community law prohibiting discrimination 
between men and women in the matter of  working conditions other than the requirement as to pay 
referred to in Article 119 of  the Treaty”.
From this perspective, the CJEU’s praetorian case-law could be relativised in the 
field of  social rights, insofar as it was clearly formalist. Such formalism was confirmed 
in Kalanke in 1995.12 In this context, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (Article 141 TEC) 
added two other paragraphs on legislative procedure and positive measures which also 
practically coincide with current paragraphs 3 and 4 of  Article 157 TFEU after the 
entry into force of  the Treaty of  Lisbon13 on December 1st 2009. In other words, 
the evolved gender perspective was a novelty introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty to 
provide a specific legal basis in the European Treaties in this field, which also aimed at 
overcoming the restrictive approach established by the CJEU in the Kalanke case, which 
started to be reviewed in the Marschall case concerning a provision similar to that in 
Kalanke but, containing a “saving clause”.14
Before the Kalanke case, the case-law of  the CJEU was basically predicated on 
two important legal acts adopted on the basis of  Article 119 TEEC: Council Directive 
75/117/EEC of  10 February 1975 on the approximation of  the laws of  the Member 
States relating to the application of  the principle of  equal pay for men and women as 
well as Council Directive 76/207/EEC of  9 February 1976, on the implementation of  
the principle of  equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, 
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions. Both Directives15 were 
12 CJEU, Judgment of  17 October 1995, Case C-450/93, Kalanke: “Article 2(1) and (4) of  Council 
Directive 76/207/EEC of  9 February 1976 on the implementation of  the principle of  equal treatment for men 
and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions precludes 
national rules such as those in the present case which, where candidates of  different sexes shortlisted for promotion are 
equally qualified, automatically give priority to women in sectors where they are underrepresented, under-representation 
being deemed to exist when women do not make up at least half  of  the staff  in the individual pay brackets in the 
relevant personnel group or in the function levels provided for in the organization chart”. 
13 See also Protocol (No. 33) concerning Article 157 TFEU 
14 CJEU, Judgment of  11 November 1997, Case C-409/95, Marschall: “A national rule which, in a 
case where there are fewer women than men at the level of  the relevant post in a sector of  the public service and both 
female and male candidates for the post are equally qualified in terms of  their suitability, competence and professional 
performance, requires that priority be given to the promotion of  female candidates unless reasons specific to an individual 
male candidate tilt the balance in his favour is not precluded by Article 2(1) and (4) of  Council Directive 76/207/
EEC of  9 February 1976, on the implementation of  the principle of  equal treatment for men and women as regards 
access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, provided that: in each individual 
case the rule provides for male candidates who are equally as qualified as the female candidates a guarantee that the 
candidatures will be the subject of  an objective assessment which will take account of  all criteria specific to the candidates 
and will override the priority accorded to female candidates where one or more of  those criteria tilts the balance in favour 
of  the male candidate, and such criteria are not such as to discriminate against the female candidates”. 
15 A connecting legal act is Council Directive 79/7/EEC of  19 December 1978 on the progressive 
implementation of  the principle of  equal treatment for men and women in matters of  social 
security. In this respect, see CJEU, Judgment of  19 October 1995, Case C-137/94, Richardson: 
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then repealed and updated by Directive 2006/54/EC.16
In conclusion, the CJEU’s praetorian case-law concerning EU Primary Law has 
been developed when having an explicit legal basis.17 For example, the CJEU already 
held in Defrenne II (Judgment of  8 April 1976, Case-43/75, where the application of  
the principle of  equal pay for women and women set out in Article 119 TEEC was 
at stake), that Article 119 TEEC was of  such a character as to have not only vertical 
effect (enforceable not merely between individuals and public authorities), but also a 
horizontal one (between individuals, Drittwirkung approach),18 since; “the prohibition on 
discrimination between men and women applies not only to the action of  public authorities, but also 
extends to all agreements which are intended to regulate paid labour collectively, as well as to contracts 
between individuals”.19
3. Consolidation of  classic social case-law under EU secondary 
law
The CJEU’s classical social case-law has obviously been consolidated by interpreting 
a wide range of  secondary legal provisions, aimed at preventing discriminatory conduct. 
Thus, EU institutions have adopted several Directives to implement the principle of  
equal treatment through the prohibition of  gender-based discrimination (Gender 
Equality Directive No 2006/54/EC), and Racial Discrimination (Racial Equality 
Directive No. 2000/43/EC), as well as a discrimination based on age, disability, religion 
and belief  and sexual orientation (Employment Equality Directive No. 2000/78/EC).
European secondary law has also been developed in the field of  safety and health 
at work on the explicit basis of  Article 118a TEEC (introduced in the primary law 
through the SEA), to which Article 153 TFEU corresponds. This is the case and 
objective of  Council Directive 92/85/EEC of  19 October 1992, on the introduction 
of  measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of  pregnant 
workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding.20
Moreover, the EU has encouraged the collaboration of  the Member States with 
the social partners in order to continue to address the problem of  the continuing 
gender-based wage differentials and marked gender segregation on the labour market 
by means of  flexible working time arrangements, which enable both men and women 
to combine family and work commitments more successfully. In this sense, part-time 
work constitutes a kind of  a pilot situation in order to verify, as foreseen in Article 157(2) 
“Article 7(l)(a) of  Directive 79/7 does not allow a Member State which, pursuant to that provision, has set the 
pensionable age for women at 60 years and for men at 65 years also to provide that women are be exempt from 
prescription charges at the age of  60 and men only at the age of  65”. 
16 Directive 2006/54/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of  the principle of  equal opportunities and equal treatment of  men and women in 
matters of  employment and occupation. 
17 In relation to pay, in its Judgment of  13 September 2007 (Case C 307/0, Del Cerro Alonso), the 
CJEU pointed out that the principle of  non-discrimination cannot be interpreted restrictively. 
18 See M. De Mol, “The Novel Approach of  the CJEU on the Horizontal Direct Effect of  the 
EU Principle of  Non-Discrimination: (Unbridled) Expansionism of  EU Law”, Maastricht Journal 
of  European and Comparative Law, No. 18 (2011), 109-135: the author focus on the “sensitive issue” of  
the application of  the EU principle of  non-discrimination in private disputes (especially, Mangold, 
C-144/04, Judgment of  22 November 2005, and Kücükdeveci, C-555/07, Judgment of  19 January 2010). 
19 Paragraph 39. 
20 See Case C 460/06, Paquay, Judgment of  11 October 2007, paragraph 27, and Case C-232/09, 
Danosa, Judgment of  11 November 2010, paragraph 58. 
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TFEU not only the specific “principle of  equal pay for equal work or work of  equal value” 
and, as a result, the combat against the gender pay gap, but also a broader framework 
ensuring “the application of  the principle of  equal opportunities and equal treatment of  men and 
women in matters of  employment and occupation”.
From this perspective, the CJEU’s case-law has dealt with specific controversies 
concerning the interpretation and application of  the European Framework Agreement 
on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC on 6 June 1997.21 The 
CJEU has also considered in breach of  EU law the legislation of  a Member State 
which requires a proportionally greater contribution period from part-time workers, 
the majority of  whom are women, than from full-time workers for the former to 
qualify, if  appropriate, for a contributory retirement pension in an amount reduced in 
proportion to the part-time nature of  their work.22
Obviously, EU secondary law has been capable of  further developments in 
parallel to the extension of  the “integration dynamics” to the social areas through the 
different “reforms of  deepening” of  the founding Treaties. Nevertheless, those Treaties 
left a partial vacuum in terms of  social policy because goals were not matched with 
effective instruments23 and this deficit has not been fully remedied yet. Indeed, in 
spite of  the explicit distribution of  competences between the EU and Member States 
through the Lisbon Treaty, a certain degree of  ambiguity still appears when facing 
the concrete delimitation between European and National parameters to achieve the 
transversal social policy, insofar as the distinction between objective, competence and 
other related notions remains complex.24
Furthermore, the entry into force of  the Lisbon Treaty took place in the context 
of  the economic crisis,25 what has even weakened those social policy instruments26 
further, since the development of  such policy has not been consolidated in accordance 
with “the procedures provided for in the Treaties”, but following new controversial procedures 
under the dynamics of  the Troika. In addition, the economic crisis has amplified the 
importance of  the OMC, which constitutes a procedure of  producing EU soft-law 
21 Annexed to Council Directive 97/81/EC of  15 December 1997 (amended by Council Directive 
98/23/EC of  7 April 1998). Among others, see Judgments of  5 November 2014 (Österreichischer 
Gewerkschaftsbund, Case-C476/12), 19 September 2013, (Hliddal, Joined Cases C 216/12 and 
C 217/129), 8 November 2012 (Heimann and Toltschin, Joined cases C-229/11 and C-230/11), 10 
April 2010 (Zentralbetriebsrat der Landeskrankenhāuser Tirols, C 486/08), 7 September 2004 (Commission 
v Belgium, Case C-469/02), 23 October 2003 (Schönheit and Becker, C 4/02 and C 5/02) and 9 
September 1999 (Krüger, C 281/97). 
22 In particular, in Judgment of  22 November 2012, Elbal Moreno, Case C-285/11, the CJEU 
concluded that there was an indirect discrimination on grounds of  sex, since the national measure at 
issue, albeit formulated in neutral terms, worked to the disadvantage of  far more women than men. 
According to the CJEU: “legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings works to the disadvantage 
of  part-time workers, such as Ms Elbal Moreno, who have worked part-time for a long time, since, in practice, 
such legislation excludes those workers from any possibility of  obtaining a retirement pension because of  the method 
used to calculate the requisite contribution period” (paragraph 30). It was an indisputable statistical fact that 
legislation such as that at issue affected women far more than men, given that, in Spain, at least 80% 
of  part-time workers were women. 
23 K.M. Anderson, Social policy..., 52-54. 
24 K. Lörcher: “Social Competences”, in The Lisbon Treaty and Social Europe, I. Schöman/K. 
Lörcher/N. Bruun (eds), (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), 165.
25 See more extensively L. Jimena Quesada, Social Rights and Policies in the European Union: New 
Challenges in a Context of  Economic Crisis, (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2016).
26 See J.I. García Ninet (dir), El impacto de la gran crisis mundial sobre el Derecho del Trabajo y de la Seguridad 
Social. Su incidencia en España, Europa y Brasil, 2008-2014, (Barcelona: Ariel, 2014)
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which does not lead to binding EU legal acts, but just requires Member States to spread 
best practices and achieve greater convergence in the social field.27 The EP had alerted, 
even before the crisis, on the abusive use of  soft-law instruments.28
As a result of  this, the new scenario has also weakened the role of  the CJEU and 
its case-law in the field of  social rights. Consequently, one of  the main challenges in this 
field is, from the CJEU’s case-law perspective, to provide the national courts with more 
elements to give full effect to social rights by taking into account the potential tools 
which are already foreseen in EU primary law (for example, the “horizontal social clause”29 
– Article 9 TFEU30 – and, of  course, the social dimension of  the EU citizenship – 
Article 18, 20 and 21 TFEU31 –, without forgetting the CFREU), in conjunction with 
a broader social Europe approach (in the spirit of  the Turin Process for the European 
Social Charter).
4. Paradoxical CJEU’s self-restraint under the evolved EU 
primary law
In the founding Treaties, Community action was not supported by any explicit 
competence in the social fields. For this reason, the secondary legislation on social 
matters adopted within the original European Communities was based on the doctrine 
of  ‘implied powers’ deriving from Article 235 TEEC (then Article 308 TEC and now the 
27 D. Trubek, “Hard Law and Soft Law in the Construction of  Social Europe: The Role of  the 
Open Method of  Co-ordination”, European Law Journal, No. 11(3) (2005), 343-364. See also 
L. López Guerra, “Soft Law y sus efectos en el ámbito del Derecho europeo de los derechos 
humanos”, in Teoría y Derecho: revista de pensamiento jurídico, No. 11, 2012, 150-167. 
28 See European Parliament resolution of  4 September 2007 on institutional and legal implications 
of  the use of  ‘soft law’ instruments (2007/2028(INI)): “(…) 18. Reiterates the importance of  Parliament’s 
participating, as the main representative of  the interests of  EU citizens, in all decision-making processes, in order to 
help reduce their current mistrust in European integration and values; 19. Stresses that the expression of  soft law, as 
well as its invocation, should be avoided at all times in any official documents of  the European institutions”. 
29 P. Vielle, “How the Horizontal Social Clause can be made to Work: The Lessons of  Gender 
Mainstreaming”, in The Lisbon Treaty and … 105. According to this author, there will be numerous 
and regular opportunities to invoke the new horizontal social clause in the national courts and 
the CJEU in order to reiterate the social aims of  the Treaty, including on those occasions when 
economic freedoms enshrined in this same Treaty are subject to examination.  
30 Article 9 TFEU: “In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account 
requirements linked to the promotion of  a high level of  employment, the guarantee of  adequate social protection, the 
fight against social exclusion, and a high level of  education, training and protection of  human health”. 
31 See G.C. Korteweg, Linking EU citizenship and social rights: ‘real link’ or illusion? A research of  
the case law of  the Court of  Justice on EU citizens’ access to social rights, Master Thesis European Law, 
Utrecht University, April 2015: the author analyses the contribution of  the CJEU’s case-law 
on EU citizens claiming social rights to the development of  the concept of  EU citizenship. The 
concept of  EU citizenship laid down in Articles 20 and 21 TFEU is interpreted in conjunction 
with the equal treatment principle laid down in Article 18 TFEU. He suggests that the case law 
of  the Court contributed significantly to EU solidarity and assures a degree of  social protection 
for all EU citizens. However, in many recent cases, such as Brey (Case C-140/12, 19 September 
2013) and Dano (Case C-333/13, 11 November 2014), which are defining the boundaries of  EU 
citizenship, it has become clear that EU citizens are still subject to certain limitations and conditions. 
In particular, on the tensions between international market principles (in health care) and the 
social rights of  the citizens of  the Union, under the balancing role of  the CJEU, see K. Lenaerts 
& T. Heremans, “Contours of  a European social union in the case-law of  the European Court of  
Justice”, in European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 2, n. 1 (Feb. 2006), 101-115. See also A. Silveira & 
C. McKenny Engström, “The emerging culture of  EU citizenship as ‘citizenship of  rights’ and the 
legal nature of  the EU polity”, in UNIO – EU Law Journal, vol. 2, n. 2 (2016), 140-154. 
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so-called ‘flexibility clause’ of  Article 352 TFEU), with the aim of  harmonising the laws 
of  Member States concerning the internal market (ex Article 100 TEEC, then Article 
94 TEC, now Article 115 TFEU).32 Such legal basis implied putting into practice the 
unanimity rule.
Later on, the Single European Act conferred explicit powers to European 
institutions by moving from unanimity to qualified majority rule in relation to the 
working environment, as regards the health and safety of  workers (Article 118, a 
TEEC), what coincides with the current Article 153(1), b TFEU. Then, the Maastricht 
Treaty 1992 extended (only through the Agreement appended to Protocol on Social 
Policy, with the opt-out from the UK) qualified majority voting to several areas: 
working conditions [ Article 153(1), b TFEU and Article 31 CFREU], the information 
and consultation of  workers [Article 153(1), e TFEU and Article 27 CFREU], equality 
between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment 
at work [Article 153(1), i TFEU and Article 23 CFREU], and the integration of  
persons excluded from the labour market [Article 153(1), b TFEU].
However, that Protocol on Social Policy incorporated to the Maastricht Treaty 
kept the unanimity rule for other areas, which include; social security and social 
protection of  workers [Article 153(1), c TFEU and Article 34 CFREU]; protection of  
workers where their employment contract is terminated [Article 153(1), d TFEU and 
Article 30 CFREU]; representation and collective defence of  the interests of  workers 
and employers [Article 153(1), f TFEU]; conditions of  employment for third-country 
nationals legally residing in Community territory [Articles 153(2), g and 179(2), b TFEU 
and Article 15 CFREU] and  financial contributions for the promotion of  employment 
and job-creation. On the other hand, that Protocol did not apply to pay, the right of  
association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs. Similarly, Article 153(1) 
TFEU keeps such exclusion.
The Amsterdam Treaty incorporated that Protocol on Social Policy to the 
provisions of  the TEC (Article 137). The new version of  Article 137 TEC adopted by 
the Nice Treaty in 2001 added two other social fields; the combating of  social exclusion 
(paragraph 1.j) and the modernisation of  social protection systems (paragraph 1.k), 
which also exactly coincide (like the whole list) with the same paragraphs in the 
current Article 153 (1) TFEU. Apart from this, both the Nice Treaty 2001 and the 
Lisbon Treaty 2009 have kept the unanimity rule (established in the Social Protocol 
to the Maastricht Treaty and in the Amsterdam Treaty) in relation to i) social security 
and social protection of  workers; ii) protection of  workers where their employment 
contract is terminated; iii) representation and collective defence of  the interests of  
workers and employers and iv) conditions of  employment for third-country nationals 
legally residing in Union territory. From this perspective, the main qualitative difference 
between the Lisbon Treaty and the previous revisions (mainly, the Amsterdam Treaty 
and the Nice Treaty) is that the TFEU has extended the ordinary legislative procedure 
(former co-decision procedure) to those social fields.33
In any case, putting into practice the Union action in these fields is very complex 
(including the use of  the adjective social),34 not only because of  the existence of  
32 See, for example, Council Directive 75/129/EEC of  17 February 1975 on the approximation of  
the laws of  the Member States relating to collective redundancies. 
33 Article 153.2 TFEU states that “To this end, the European Parliament and the Council…”, while Article 
137 TEC (Amsterdam and Nice consolidated versions) said that “To this end, the Council...”. 
34 In EU language “social” also relates to employment policy, working conditions and labour law. 
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potential and different procedures and actors foreseen in Article 153 TFEU (Member 
States, European institutions and bodies as well as European social partners), but also 
because the boundary problems concerning the distributions of  competences are 
evident in relation to social policy.35
As is well known, the Lisbon Strategy (agreed in the Lisbon European Council in 
March 2000 and targeted the year 2010) included, in the framework of  a comprehensive 
approach, the promotion of  the inclusion of  people who suffer from poverty or social 
exclusion. Similarly, the EU 2020 Strategy (which came into effect on 17 June 2010 as 
the follow-up strategy to the Lisbon Strategy) has outlined, among the five strategic 
headline targets, two targets which are directly related to the labour market and social 
policies, namely; that the EU is to raise employment rates among men and women to 
75 per cent and reduce the number of  persons at risk of  poverty and social exclusion 
by 20 million by the year 2020.
In this last regard, while Article 153(1), j, TFEU includes “the combating of  social 
exclusion”, Article 153(2) TFEU does not even mention this field among the potential 
actions and procedures to be undertaken. In other words, paragraph 2 of  Article 153 
TFEU does not paradoxically empower the EU institutions to take any measures 
towards the end established in its paragraph 1. How to compensate this intentional 
omission? On the one hand, it is clear that in compliance with the principle of  
subsidiarity, Member States’ local, regional and national authorities have a primary and 
major role to play in adopting initiatives to combat poverty and social exclusion. On 
the other hand, it is also evident that the combating of  exclusion is not only one of  the 
Union’s social objectives according to Article 151 TFEU (in conjunction with Article 
153 TFEU), but also one of  the Union’s main and general objectives set forth in Article 
3 TEU, which refers to; “a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment 
and social progress” by adding that the EU “shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and 
shall promote social justice and protection, (…) solidarity between generations (…)” (paragraph 3).36
As a result, Article 34 CFREU must also be taken into account by “institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies of  the Union with due regard for the principle of  subsidiarity” and by 
“Member States” when they are implementing EU law (in accordance with Article 51 
CFREU). In particular, paragraph 3 of  Article 34 CFREU states that; “in order to combat 
social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance 
From this point of  view, the adjective “social” may be applied not only to the specific Title X of  
the TFEU on “Social Policy”, but also to Titles IX (“Employment), XII (“Education, Vocational 
Training, Youth and Sport”) and XVIII (“Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion”). It must also be 
recalled that, before the Lisbon Treaty, social policy was included into a broader Title on “Social 
Policy, Education, Vocational Training and Youth” (Title VIII in the Maastricht Treaty and Title XI in 
both the Amsterdam and the Nice Treaties). 
35 P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 
180: “the difficulties in this area are especially marked, since certain aspects of  social policy fall within shared 
competence, although it is not clear which; other aspects appear to fall within the category of  supporting, coordinating, 
and supplementary action, even though they are not within the relevant list, ant there is in addition separate provision 
for social policy in the category being considered here”. 
36 In addition, paragraph 5 of  Article 3 TEU states: “In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall 
uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of  its citizens. It shall contribute to (…) 
solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of  poverty and the protection of  human 
rights”. In the same vein, these general objectives established in Article 3 TEU are closely related to 
the values referred to in Article 2 TEU: “The Union is founded on the values of  respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of  law and respect for human rights, including the rights of  persons belonging 
to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. 
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so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules 
laid down by Union law and national laws and practices”.
In light of  this last consideration, an essential reference must be made to the 
explanation on Article 34 CFREU, which explicitly refers to Article 13 (the right to 
social and medical assistance) and Articles 30 (the right to protection against poverty 
and social exclusion) and 31 (the right to housing) of  the 1996 Revised European 
Social Charter as well as, above all, to Article 153 TFEU, by somehow compensating 
the aforementioned omission. This Explanation holds: “Paragraph 3 draws on Article 13 
of  the European Social Charter and Articles 30 and 31 of  the revised Social Charter and point 10 
of  the Community Charter. The Union must respect it in the context of  policies based on Article 153 
of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union”.
In this sense, some authors have proposed a “human-developmental interpretation” 
of  EU Primary Law which, should lead to the systematic promotion of  social goals 
enshrined in the Treaty in connection with the CFREU. Their premise is that the EU 
is not based solely on objectives, and the notion of  values appeared in the European 
discourse with the conclusion of  the Constitutional Treaty,37 which was has been 
“substantially rescued” on these matters by the Lisbon Treaty.38 From this perspective, 
those authors developed an evaluation of  the CFREU, looking at the constitutional 
values underlying the Charter with the purpose of  strengthening the social dimension 
vis-à-vis the conflicting economic objectives.39 Nonetheless, these authors seem to be 
much more in favour of  another instrument (instead of  EU Law and the CJEU’s case-
law): the ECHR, supported by the ECtHR.40
In my view, in spite of  the self-restraint exercised by the CJEU in some social 
fields (and, especially, its reluctance to exploit the social rights recognised in the CFREU 
under the heading of  ‘solidarity’), the importance of  the social case-law from the ECtHR 
cannot be exaggerated. In the field of  combating poverty and social exclusion, without 
prejudice to several interesting judgments from Strasbourg,41 the specific case-law on 
this topic is being elaborated by the European Committee of  Social Rights, precisely 
under Articles 13, 30 and 31 of  the European Social Charter.42
Ultimately, the paradoxical evolution of  CJEU’s case-law in the field of  social 
rights lies in the fact that it played, in the past, a praetorian role in a context of  implied 
37 See S. Deakin, “The Lisbon Treaty, the Viking and Laval Judgments and the Financial Crisis: In 
Search of  New Foundations for Europe’s Social Market Economy”, in The Lisbon Treaty and Social 
Europe, I. Schöman/K. Lörcher/N. Bruun (eds), op.cit., 19. 
38 F. Aldecoa Luzarraga & M. Guinea Llorente, El rescate sustancial de la Constitución Europea a través del 
Tratado de Lisboa: la salida del laberinto, Real Instituto Elcano (Working Paper No. 9), Madrid, 2008. 
See also J. Ziller, “Il Trattato modificativo del 2007: sostanza salvata e forma cambiata del Trattto 
costituzionale de 2004”, Quaderni costituzionali, No. 4 (2007), 875-892. 
39 See also C. Peraro, “Right to collective action in cross-border employment contexts: a 
fundamental social right not yet covered by EU private international law”, UNIO – EU Law Journal, 
Vol. 2, No. 2 (2016), 20-38. 
40 In particular, P. Dorssemont, “Values and Objectives”, in The Lisbon Treaty and Social Europe, I. 
Schöman/K. Lörcher/N. Bruun (eds), op.cit., 45. See also A. Bar Cendón, “La Unión Europea como 
unión de valores y derechos: teoría y realidad”, in Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, No. 33 (2014), 99-139.
41 E.g., ECtHR, Winterstein and Others v France, Judgment of  17 October 2013. A contextual analysis 
of  this social case-law from the ECtHR in López Guerra, “La protección de derechos económicos 
y sociales en el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos”, in Tratado sobre Protección de Derechos 
Sociales, M. Terol Becerra/L. Jimena Quesada (dirs), Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2014, 297-317. 
42 Among others, Decisions on the Merits of  18 February 2009 (Complaint No. 48/2008, ERRC 
v Bulgaria), of  25 June 2010 (Complaint No. 58/2009, COHRE v Italy) and of  28 June 2011 
(Complaint No. 63/2010, COHRE v. France). Cf. ECtHR Budina v Russia, Decision of  18 June 2009. 
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powers and modest EU primary legal provisions, whereas now, it is showing a clear 
self-restraint under explicit competences and an evolved EU primary law (including 
the CFREU). To face such a paradox, a more expansive judicial activism and opening 
to judicial dialogue may be traced in the sphere of  social rights in order to avoid 
inconsistencies within the EU Charter, and thus with democratic legitimacy.43
In real terms, the social case-law from the CJEU has evolved and is undoubtedly 
valuable. In contrast, it has known a recent restrictive evolution in other fields covered 
by Article 153 TFEU and the CFREU, such as the workers’ right to information and 
consultation within the undertaking (Article 27 CFREU) or protection in the event 
of  unjustified dismissal (Article 30 CFREU). Furthermore, these two aspects have 
been assessed without taking into consideration the European Social Charter (and 
the interpretation by the European Committee of  Social Rights) and, therefore, both 
have raised the issue of  real or potential divergent views between the CJEU and the 
Committee.
In particular, concerning the right to information and consultation within the 
undertaking, the recent restricted approach (restriction contrary to the Opinion of  
Advocate General Cruz Villalón) is illustrated by case C-176/12, Association de médiation 
sociale, Judgment of  15 January 2014.44 By contrast, the same situation was analysed 
by the Committee under Article 21 of  the Revised Social Charter and, also by taking 
into account EU law (even in the light of  the aforementioned judgment of  the CJEU, 
which is explicitly cited), it concluded that there was a breach of  such provisions.45
In relation to protection in case of  termination of  employment, in Case C-117/14 
(Nisttahuz Poclava, Judgment of  5 February 2015) the CJEU decided not to tackle the 
impact (under EU and external law sources which were explicitly mentioned by the 
referring domestic court)46 of  the new employment contract to support entrepreneurs 
43 P. Gjortler, “Democratic Legitimacy and the Court of  Justice of  the European Union”, in 
Democratic Legitimacy in the European Union and Global Governance. Building a European Demos, B. Pérez de 
las Heras (ed), (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 180.
44 According to this ruling: “Article 27 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union, 
by itself  or in conjunction with the provisions of  Directive 2002/14/EC of  the European Parliament and of  
the Council of  11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the 
European Community, must be interpreted to the effect that, where a national provision implementing that directive, 
such as Article L. 1111-3 of  the French Labour Code, is incompatible with European Union law, that article 
of  the Charter cannot be invoked in a dispute between individuals in order to disapply that national provision”. 
See also, in the same restrictive direction (concerning Article 20 of  the EU Charter), CJEU, Case 
C-198/13, Julián Hernández, Judgment of  10 July 2014. 
45 See Conclusions 2014, Article 21, France (published in January 2015): “The minimum framework which 
the Committee has adopted for Article 21 of  the Charter is Directive 2002/14/EC of  the European Parliament 
and of  the Council of  11 March 2002. In this context, the Committee points out that all categories of  worker 
(all employees holding an employment contract with the company regardless of  their status, length of  service or place 
of  work) must be included in the calculation of  the number of  employees enjoying the right to information and 
consultation (judgments of  the Court of  Justice of  the European Union, Confédération générale du travail 
and Others, Case No. C-385/05 of  18 January 2007, and Association de médiation sociale, Case No. 
C-176/12 of  15 January 2014). It considers therefore that the exclusion, provided for in Article L. 1111-3 of  
the Code, of  workers on state-subsidised contracts from the calculation of  companies’ staff  numbers – a calculation 
which is necessary to determine the minimum thresholds beyond which staff  representative bodies ensuring the 
information and consultation of  workers must be set up – is not in conformity with the Charter”. 
46 Including Article 30 CFREU, Directive 1999/70, 1982 ILO Convention No. 158 concerning 
the Termination of  Employment at the Initiative of  the Employer and the 1961 European Social 
Charter 1961 (in relation to the decision of  the European Committee of  Social Rights of  23 May 
2012 on a similar Greek contract, Complaint No. 65/2011, General federation of  employees of  the national 
electric power corporation and Confederation of  Greek Civil Servants’ Trade Unions v. Greece). 
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(entailing a one-year probationary period during which the employer might freely 
terminate the contract without notice or compensation) introduced in Spain by Law 
3/2012 of  6 July 2012 on urgent measures for labour market reform to face the 
economic crisis. For the CJEU, in spite of  Article 30 CFREU, the situation at issue 
paradoxically did not fall within the scope of  EU law.
5. Final thoughts: the necessary opening of  the CJEU to the 
new framework of  the European Pillar of  Social Rights
The last two rulings from the CJEU (the Association de médiation sociale and Nisttahuz 
Poclava cases) reveal a restrictive position in relation to the CFREU (in particular to 
the workers’ right to information and consultation within the undertaking – Article 
27 – and to the protection in the event of  unjustified dismissal – Article 30) and, at the 
same time, a reluctant approach to the more favourable standards in these fields under 
the European Social Charter and the interpretation from the European Committee of  
Social Rights. By contrast, the ECtHR has been more sensitive to establishing a judicial 
dialogue with the Committee.47
With this in mind, the consistency with these Council of  Europe standards also 
demonstrates a controversial judicial strategy from the domestic courts which have 
submitted an unnecessary request for a preliminary ruling (since both national courts 
were entitled -and had- to exercise the conventionality control, by directly applying the 
Social Charter and the Committee’s case-law)48 and, in parallel, have made emerged 
contradictory solutions putting the credibility of  the whole human rights European 
system at risk. 
My constructive criticism leads to a clear conclusion, which is that the necessary 
opening of  the CJEU to the new framework of  the European Pillar of  Social Rights, as 
part of  the broader ‘Turin process for the European Social Charter’, through positive judicial 
willingness (by taking into account the synergies between the EU and the Council of  
Europe – including the case-law from the European Committee of  Social Rights). 
Indeed, the adjective “social” was explicitly added to the definition of  the “European 
economic model” late in the primary law of  the EU, particularly in the Lisbon Treaty, but 
it gave legally binding force to the CFREU, whose catalogue of  social rights (especially 
those under the heading “Solidarity”) have been precisely based on the European Social 
Charter of  the Council of  Europe. The latter, which reflects to a large extent the 
“European social model”, has been ratified by all Member States of  the EU (in most cases 
even before EU membership).
From this point of  view, it is evident that normative interactions between the 
Social Charter and EU law are explicit. Firstly, the references to the Social Charter have 
been confirmed by the current sources of  EU primary law after the entry into force 
of  the Treaty of  Lisbon,49 including the CFREU (see the Appended Explanations). 
47 For an illustration, see ECtHR, Sørensen and Rasmussen v Denmark, Judgment of  11 January 2006, as 
well as Demir and Baykara v Turkey, Judgment of  12 November 2008. 
48 See C. Salcedo Beltrán, “La aplicabilidad directa de la Carta Social Europea por los órganos 
judiciales”, Trabajo y Derecho, No. 13, enero 2016, 27-52. See also G. Guiglia, “The importance of  
the European Social Charter in the Italian Legal System: in pursuit of  a stronger protection of  
social rights in a normative and internationally integrated system”, in European Social Charter and 
the challenges of  the XXI century. La Charte Sociale Européenne et les défis du XXIe siècle, M. D’Amico/G. 
Guiglia (eds), Napoli, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2014, in particular, 85-87. 
49 See TEU (Preamble, §5) as well as TFEU (Article 151). 
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Secondly, the links between the Social Charter and sources of  EU secondary law are 
also important in both directions as well.50 Finally, the Social Charter is also presented 
in significant non-binding instruments of  the EU, precisely related to legal synergies 
between the Council of  Europe and the EU.51
With such premises, regarding the establishment of  coherent and harmonious 
relationships between the two normative systems (EU and Council of  Europe)52 in 
favour of  the harmonization of  the social models, it appears essential to positively 
exploit the “horizontal social clause” (Article 9 TFEU) as well as the social dimension of  
the CFREU (both at judicial53 and non-judicial levels)54, without forgetting the EU 
accession to the European Social Charter55 as a further step to complete the parallel 
accession to the ECHR.56
However, these normative links appear to be more complex in practice. Actually, in 
contrast with the Bosphorus doctrine,57 the European Committee of  Social Rights has 
not accepted a general presumption of  compatibility between EU social legislation and 
50 As well known, the Community Charter of  the Fundamental Social Rights of  Workers (a 
declaration adopted in 1989 by eleven Heads of  State and Government of  the European Economic 
Community) was explicitly inspired by the Charter of  1961. On the basis of  this declaration, the 
community institutions then adopted a series of  directives on labour law. On the other hand, the 
Explanatory Report of  the Revised Social Charter makes clear that some of  its provisions were 
inspired by those directives. 
51 I.e. European Parliament Resolution of  27 February 2014 on the situation of  fundamental rights 
in the European Union (2012): “The European Parliament, (…) – having regard to the European Social 
Charter, as revised in 1996, and the case law of  the European Committee of  Social Rights, (…)”. 
52 See M. Brillat, Le principe de non-discrimination à l’épreuve des rapports entre les droits européens, Institut 
Universitaire Varenne, Paris, 2015, in particular Part II (“L’indispensable cohérence européenne en 
matière d’interdiction de toute discrimination”), 219 and ff. 
53 Cf. the restrictive approach which has been recently expressed by the CJEU, among others, in 
Case C-539/14, Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García, Order of  16 July 2015: “that provision of  the Charter 
[Article 34(3) CFREU] does not guarantee the right to housing, but rather ‘the right to social and housing 
assistance’ in social policies based on Article 153 TFEU” (paragraph 49). 
54 See the Opinion of  the Management Board of  the FRA on the European Commission’s Proposal for a New 
Multi-Annual Framework (2013-2015) for the Agency: “the new Framework should include social rights explicitly. 
This would ensure a balance of  coverage of  the rights listed in the Charter, which take up almost a quarter of  this 
instrument and are of  particular relevance to everyone”. 
55 See O. De Schutter, L’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Charte sociale européenne. Bruxelles: 
Université Catholique de Louvain, 8 July 2014, 54 pages (http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/
socialcharter/Presentation/PublicationCSEUEODeSchutterJuly2014_en.pdf; visited on 6 August 
2014). The report recalls the reasons why the dossier now deserves to be revisited. 
56 Cf. CJEU (Full Court), Opinion 2/13, 18 December 2014: “The agreement on the accession of  the EU to 
the ECHR is not compatible with Article 6(2) TEU or with Protocol (No. 8) relating to Article 6(2) TEU on 
the accession of  the EU to the ECHR”. By contrast, as stated in the European Parliament Resolution of  19 
May 2010 on the institutional aspects of  the accession of  the EU to the ECHR [Document of  the European 
Parliament 2009/2241(INI)]: “(…) 30. Notes that accession by the Union to the ECHR signifies 
the recognition by the EU of  the entire system of  protection of  human rights, as developed and 
codified in numerous documents and bodies of  the Council of  Europe; in this sense, accession 
by the Union to the ECHR constitutes an essential first step which should subsequently be 
complemented by accession by the Union to, inter alia, the European Social Charter, signed in Turin 
on 18 October 1961 and revised in Strasbourg on 3 May 1996, which would be consistent with 
the progress already enshrined in the Charter of  Fundamental Rights and in the social legislation 
of  the Union; 31. (…) stresses also the need for the Union to be involved in the work of  the 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Committee of  Social Rights, (…) and asks to be 
duly informed of  the conclusions and decisions of  these bodies;…”. 
57 ECtHR, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Tutizim ve Ticaret Anoniom Sirketi v Ireland, Application No. 
45036/98, Judgment of  30 June 2005. 
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the Social Charter,58 in particular in controversial areas such as organisation of  working 
time59 or delocalisation of  undertakings and social dumping,60 without forgetting anti-
crisis legislation and austerity measures.61
This lack of  presumption is very significant, in view of  the overlapping 
membership of  the European Union and the Council of  Europe. From this point of  
view, the complexities of  synergies are accentuated, since the European Committee of  
Social Rights is increasingly occupying a place next to the two European Courts (CJEU 
and the ECtHR)62 in this area.63 
Nevertheless, overcoming such complexities depends on a simple human factor, 
that it to say, to promote a positive judicial willingness in order to exploit the favor 
libertatis or pro personae clauses (Articles 52(3) and 53 CFREU, Article 53 ECHR or 
Article 32 of  the European Social Charter – Article H of  the Revised Charter) through 
58 See further developments in P. Stangos, “Les rapports entre la Charte sociale européenne et le 
droit de l’Union européenne: le rôle singulier du Comité européen des Droits Sociaux et de sa 
jurisprudence”, in Cahiers de droit européen, No. 49, 2013, 319-393. 
59 E.g. Decision on the merits of  23 June 2010 on Complaint No. 55/2009, Confédération Générale du 
Travail v France, paragraphs 31-42.  
60 E.g. Decision on admissibility and the merits on Complaint No. 85/2012, Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation (LO) and Swedish Confederation of  Professional Employees (TCO) v Sweden), paragraphs 72-74.
61 The Court of  Luxembourg has conferred an important weight to national parameters (or, more 
exactly, to state margin of  discretion) based on anti-crisis legislation incorporating austerity measures 
deriving from the operations of  the Troika. A recent illustration of  this approach is offered by the 
above mentioned Case C 117/14 (Nisttahuz Poclava, Judgment of  5 February 2015), concerning the 
employment contract of  indefinite duration to support entrepreneurs introduced by Law 3/2012 
of  6 July 2012 on urgent measures for labour market reform, which amended the employment 
legislation because of  the economic crisis that Spain was undergoing. The CJEU stated that Article 30 
CFREU was not stake, since “the fact that the employment contract of  indefinite duration to support 
entrepreneurs may be financed by structural funds is not sufficient, in itself, to support the conclusion 
that the situation at issue in the main proceedings involves the implementation of  EU law for the 
purposes of  Article 51(1) of  the Charter” (paragraph 42). In addition, for the CJEU, the external 
international sources which are invoked by the referring court (including those explicitly mentioned in 
Article 151 TFEU, such as the European Social Charter) would not have any impact, due to the fact 
that “the Court has no jurisdiction under Article 267 TFEU to rule on the interpretation of  provisions 
of  international law which bind Member States outside the framework of  EU law” (paragraph 43). 
For these reasons, the Court concluded the situation at issue in the main proceedings did not fall 
within the scope of  EU law. The final solution reached in Luxembourg is perhaps not so deceiving 
if  we take into account the fact that, this way, a potential contradiction between the CJEU and the 
previous decision adopted on 23 May 2012 by the European Committee of  Social Rights (Complaint 
No. 65/2011, General federation of  employees of  the national electric power corporation and Confederation of  Greek 
Civil Servants’ Trade Unions v. Greece) has been avoided. In particular, in its decision, the Committee of  
Strasbourg declared that the 2010 Greek legislation (imposed by the Troika) allowing dismissal without 
notice or compensation of  employees in an open-ended contract during an initial period of  twelve 
months was incompatible with Article 4§4 of  the 1961 Social Charter. 
62 From this point of  view, in a Decision of  7 May 2013, the ECtHR declared inadmissible the cases of  
Ioanna Koufaki and ADEDY (Applications No. 57665/12 and 57657/12) v Greece. Relying on Article 1 of  
Protocol No. 1, the applicants complained of  the cuts in wages and pensions resulting from Laws No. 
3833/2010, 3845/2010 and 3847/2010 (the second applicant also alleged violations of  Articles 6 § 1, 8, 
13, 14 and 17 of  the ECHR). In spite of  the substantial similarities with Complaints No. 76 to 80/2012, 
the ECtHR reached its decision without referring to the decisions on the merits of  the European 
Committee of  Social Rights of  7 December 2012. As a matter of  fact, it considered that “the complaint 
concerning Article 1 of  Protocol No. 1 is manifestly ill-founded” (paragraph 49). In addition, with regards to the 
complaint concerning the other alleged provisions of  the ECHR, the Court found nothing in the case file 
which might disclose “any appearance of  a violation of  these provisions” (paragraph 50).
63 See S. Douglas-Scott, “A Tale of  Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing 
European Human Rights Acquis”, in Common Market Law Review, No. 43 (2006), 629. 
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a sincere judicial dialogue at both horizontal (CJEU, ECtHR and European Committee 
of  Social Rights) and vertical (with National Courts) levels (multi-level protection).64 
Such mutual inter-action is of  central importance to the development of  social 
rights standards in constitutionalising the European Social model. Indeed, strengthening 
the synergies between the EU and the Council of  Europe is, in my view, one of  the key 
elements for the success of  the new European Pillar of  Social Rights, as part of  the 
broader Turin process for the European Social Charter.
64 F. Valdés Dal-Ré, El constitucionalismo laboral europeo y la protección multinivel de los derechos laborales 
fundamentales: luces y sombras (Albacete: Bomarzo, 2016). More specifically, the favor libertatis clause 
of  the CFREU has been emphasized has an essential element in connection with the actual 
enforcement of  the judgments of  the CJEU in order “to optimize the domestic legal order and, above all, 
as an essential element to improve the degree of  Europeanism of  citizenship”. B. Tomás Mallén, “La ejecución 
de sentencias del Tribunal de Justicia como responsabilidad constitucional compartida: luces y 
sombras”, in Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, No. 39 (2017), 481. 
